Closing the gap: the link between social capital and microfinance services by Lopez-Rodriguez, Patricia & De la Torre Garcia, Rodolfo
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Closing the gap: the link between social
capital and microfinance services
Patricia Lopez-Rodriguez and Rodolfo De la Torre Garcia
Instituto Tecnolo´gico Auto´nomo de Me´xico (ITAM)
July 2000
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23220/
MPRA Paper No. 23220, posted 10. June 2010 16:39 UTC
 1 
 
Closing the gap: the link between social capital and microfinance services 
 
Patricia Lopez-Rodriguez and Rodolfo De la Torre 
 
Abstract 
 
Social capital has strengthened the solidarity funds when the legal mechanisms 
and institutions for monitoring and assistance are not present. The aim of this paper is 
to analyze the effect of social capital on productivity and performance of 
microfinance’s cooperatives using the Mexican solidarity funds. For this, an estimator 
indirectly associated with inequality was obtained and extrapolation method was 
used. The results show that if the social capital rises 1%, the number of loans and the 
savings amount increases in percentage terms; for each additional producer that 
activates its social capital with its partners there will be a general increase in loans 
recoveries. In this sense, a greater investment in social capital will recover a larger 
amount of borrowed funds and will increase savings and loans to poor producers. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Access to formal financial services by the poor is nonexistent or difficult, considering that the 
poor do not have guarantees or collateral. The credit risk they entail and the resulting high 
interest rates they have to pay contribute to exclude them from the formal markets. 
Microfinance schemes that operate with social capital provide substitutes in terms of the 
social collateral and low-cost alternatives for lenders. Social capital is known as a set of 
individual characteristics that allow them to trust each other, cooperate and form networks 
useful for solving economic problems. 
 
Social capital in microfinance facilitates access to credit and improves the performance of its 
financial operations. This allows microfinance schemes to achieve financial sustainability by 
raising their recoveries and reducing transaction costs and monitoring. The social capital in 
microfinance operates through information flows and better members’ selection, diminishing 
frauds and the risk of bankruptcy. 
 
The central objective of this paper is to analyze the effect of the social capital in the 
performance of the solidarity funds, on the understanding that greater social capital improves 
access to financial services to promote microfinance schemes. This could be relevant 
considering that there is little access to financial services in Mexico, especially within the 
poor.  
 
Since it is not possible to directly measure the social capital it is associated with an indicator 
that relates inversely the social capital with inequality, as the literature shows (Kawachi, 
1997). In order to relate social capital with microfinance’s indicators, an extrapolation method 
is used to get social capital indicators at municipal level; this is obtained through an income 
inequality index. For this purpose, the following hypotheses are explored: a) social capital can 
be estimated through an inequality index; b) social capital affects the productivity, and c) 
social capital affects the financial performance of the solidarity funds. 
 
To test the first hypothesis, social capital is estimated through an inequality index. The 
estimations are made with two methods and five indexes: Robin Hood, Variation Coefficient, 
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Gini and Relative Deprivation. The first method is based on a theoretical model that defines 
its nonlinear functional form. The social capital indicator consists on the resources offered by 
a person and it relates theoretically with a coefficient of sympathy, which represents the 
degree to which a person joins the welfare of another in its utility function, leading to share 
resources with others. The second method is the estimation of a linear equation that 
incorporates both a trust indicator from the World Values Survey and each of the four 
inequality indexes. From the statistical results, it is inferred that the best social capital 
estimator is the coefficient of variation. 
 
To test the second and third hypothesis, the financial indicators from the solidarity funds and 
the estimator of social capital previously obtained are considered. Two equations are 
estimated to show the effect of social capital in the solidarity funds products (savings and 
loans). Productivity is estimated by the degree of dependence of loans on fund lending and 
social capital and the dependence of savings on the assets and social capital. To test 
performance, an equation that measures the dependence of the borrowed funds recoveries on 
loans average and social capital is proposed. The equations are represented by Cobb Douglas 
production functions and the social capital is incorporated as an indirect factor associated with 
the job. 
 
From the estimation of the first equation, it is inferred that the number of loans depends 
positively on lending funds and social capital. The results suggest that with higher social 
capital and higher amount of resources available in the Solidarity funds the greater the 
number of loans is to be granted. From the second equation estimation, it is inferred that the 
number of savings transactions depends positively on assets and social capital. Therefore, the 
provision of greater resources through the expansion of assets generates greater savings; and 
higher social capital will produce greater trust to deposit resources in the solidarity funds. 
 
From the third equation estimation it is inferred that recoveries of the borrowed funds depend 
on average loans and social capital. Then it is obtained that social capital has a positive effect 
in the performance of the Solidarity funds via recoveries and that these recoveries present a 
diverse behaviour when the average loans increase. Therefore, it is inferred that social capital 
has an effect on productivity and financial performance of the Solidarity funds. 
 
The main outcome of this paper is that an increase of 1% on members’ social capital increases 
loans in 0.29% and increases savings transactions in 0.46%, while each additional unit of 
social capital retrieves loans in 597 Mexican pesos, which otherwise would not be paid. In the 
process of achieving these results, it is confirmed that greater inequality in income 
distribution is associated with a lower trust among solidarity funds members, that is, with less 
social capital. 
 
This article has been structured in 10 sections. The second section explains the definition of 
social capital and its different meanings, the definition to be used and the methodologies for 
its measurement. On the following section are described some reasons why the poor have 
restricted access to the financial system. Section four explains the solidarity funds operation 
and its relationship with social capital. Section five reports the financial solidarity funds 
indicators. Section six describes the methodology and data sources for estimating the social 
capital. Section seven develops a theoretical model that underlies the functional form and 
basis for estimating the relationship between capital and inequality. In section nine some 
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estimators are obtained and the working hypotheses are developed in addition to the estimated 
econometric equations. Finally section 10 concludes. 
 
2. Definition and measurement of social capital  
 
Social capital concept is relatively recent, developed by Pierre Bourdieu in the 1970s and 
early 1980s, as such it may be placed in the first half of the 20th century and its applications 
in the past 20 years. In the past, the concept was part of the skills, experience and knowledge 
that people used in isolation to transform into a productive process while human relations 
were found exclusively in the social structure. Coleman (1988) established that the 
relationships, when people try to make better use of their resources, are not only components 
of the social structure but resources for people. 
 
Social capital refers to networks, norms and trust that facilitate cooperation for mutual benefit 
(Putnam, 1993). Social capital fosters reciprocity norms, allows the coordination and 
communication by creating channels through which information can flow from individuals, 
tested and verified. Contributes to solve problems of collective action and reduce the 
incentives for opportunism. 
 
Social capital concept is based on trust that distinguishes it from legal and political bodies and 
civil society. Including customs and forms of association that are spontaneous and not 
necessarily dependent on laws. Through trust it promotes cooperation and contributes to the 
achievement of agreements that involve risks in making decisions. Trust allows reducing costs 
associated with the formation and negotiation of agreements. 
 
In literature there are two sides in discussing this concept; the first is linked to the way 
resources are obtained. The information, ideas and support that people can obtain through the 
relationship with others are considered as capital. Another type of capital is obtained in a 
different ways such as physical or human, which are essentially property of the people and do 
not depend on others. The second concerns the nature and extent to which people engage in 
various informal networks and formal civic organizations. The term here is used to 
characterize the different ways in which individuals interact. 
 
The concept also has three ways to interface to access resources. The first relates to the 
“bonding” social capital –show the bonds of people on the basis of their sociodemographic 
characteristics, such as those that occur between family members, neighbours, close friends 
and co-workers. The second relates to “bridging” social capital –the bonds between people 
that relate mainly in groups with similar characteristics. The third relates to “linking” social 
capital –show the ties that a person uses with a position of authority to get resources, as a 
public representative (police, political party leaders) and institutions (banks, security 
agencies) (Gittell and Vidal 1998, Narayan 2002, Putnam 2000, Woolcock 1999). 
 
The “bridging” social capital is perceived as horizontal, while “linking” social capital is more 
vertical, connecting people to resources and key economic institutions. In the case of 
“linking”, social capital is not the presence of the institutions which is an asset, but the nature 
and extent of social bonds between customers and suppliers, many of which are inherently a 
way to get resources and/or services. 
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Not always these three forms of social capital bring positive effects. They can be used for 
harmful purposes; for example, some exclusion rules are made to deny access to people for a 
service. The “linking” social capital can also be despotic or a mechanism for political 
favouritism. Then, the different dimensions of social capital not always provide useful results 
for the generation of goods and services. 
 
From the scope, social capital definition also distinguishes two types (cognitive and 
structural) and two dimensions (macro and micro) (Grootaert et al 2002). The breadth of the 
concept has been seen as a sign of strength and weakness. The weakness lies in being a 
multidimensional concept, it could be too broad to provide specific conclusions about 
individual behaviour or more complex structures. The strength lies in the complementarities 
and substitution levels.  
 
Social capital definition considered here is the following: “The sympathy that a person has 
towards another that causes that one offers social capital. People, who offer social capital, 
generate benefits, advantages and preferential treatment to others” (Robison and Siles, 1997). 
There are three reasons for adopting the above definition; on one hand, it takes into account 
the positive aspect of the concept. Secondly, it considers a micro level approach: a set of 
individual preferences that incorporates the well-being of others in the own welfare. Thirdly, 
it distinguishes what social capital is from what it makes and where it resides (Robison, Siles 
and Schmid, 2004).  
 
The lack of an agreed definition of social capital, combined with multidisciplinary approaches 
can generate different interpretations and ways of estimating the concept. Measuring social 
capital depends on how it is defined. Depending on the definition, some indicators may be 
more appropriate than others. 
 
Because definitions of social capital are multidimensional, incorporating different levels and 
units of analysis, such as organizations and community networks, makes it difficult to obtain a 
single measure of social capital. As a result, indexes are generated that approximate estimates 
of social capital. However, there is a risk that these measures could end up capturing different 
dimensions to the original concept. 
 
One way to find a balance between these measures is to decompose the concept into its 
different dimensions and thus generate new comparable data sets. Some of the dimensions of 
social capital relate to the size (the number of people with social capital), geographical 
dispersion, density/integration, composition and homogeneity of members, frequency of 
contact between members, strength of ties (degree of intimacy, reciprocity, expectations of 
durability and availability), social participation and social anchorage (years of residence, 
neighbourhood and community participation). Using these dimensions has also the risk of 
mixing the determinants with the results, and sometimes its determinants could be even their 
results (e.g. health and cultural diversity). 
 
In literature (Grootaert and van Bastelaer, 2002), the indicators generally used to measure 
social capital are trust in people or governments, culture, sympathy, affinity, solidarity, 
friendship, membership in civic organizations, time to maintain public services and conflict 
resolution, collaboration or cooperation with others, social mobility, social participation, 
social skills, building networks, shared norms, sense of obligation toward others and 
volunteering, among others. 
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However, indicators that measure participation and membership to groups vaguely capture the 
social capital by counting only the percentage of the population that belong to an 
organization. Participation in an organization can have different degrees, for example active 
membership is different than simple membership and within the active membership, and the 
degree of participation could be different in terms of the number of personal contacts and time 
spent on solving common problems. 
 
Additionally, membership in an organization can reflect past investments in social capital and 
not the current state of the capital. Contacts in an organization may differ depending on the 
time in the organization or its investment in real capital. Thus, the membership may reflect a 
high level of social capital or a high depreciation. Also, belonging to an organization does not 
imply affinity or increased participation, and being a member of more than one organization 
does not necessarily have more value in terms of social capital than a greater involvement in 
one organization. Moreover, if a person belongs to an organization it tends to generate 
positive externalities, while an individual status tends to generate negative externalities, 
especially when it is a zero-sum game. 
 
In relation to the trust indicators, they are not necessarily good measures of individual social 
capital. For example if a person trusts in another it does not necessarily imply reciprocity, 
then if people does not have a repayment for its trust, being more trusted will not be 
individually more productive. 
 
Usually, social capital indicators are obtained from surveys, for example, some indicators like 
trust and civic cooperation are obtained from the World Values Survey (Knack and Keefer, 
1997). Others like newspaper readers, membership in associations like football and coral 
clubs and confidence in public institutions come from the General Social Survey (Putnam, 
1995). Teachers, Paasche and Carver (1997) used parent participation in meetings of 
community organizations, church youth groups involving their children and parental 
involvement in school affairs from the National Educational Longitudinal Survey. 
 
Although there are surveys where social capital indicators can be obtained, it has not been 
possible to get a single variable for its measurement, this is due to several reasons: 1) 
definitions of social capital are multidimensional with different levels and units of analysis, 2) 
any attempt to measure concepts such as trust, networks, collaboration, participation and 
organization is problematic, mainly because of lack of agreement about its meaning, 3) few 
long-term surveys are designed to measure social capital so as to compare results over time, 
and 4) some social capital indicators are only at national level but not in more disaggregated 
units of analysis, like at the municipal level as the case of measures of trust in government, 
voter trends, members of civil society organizations, hours given to voluntary work. 
 
Other social capital indicators are obtained through approaches to other variables. The 
variable commonly used is inequality, measured by different indices: Robin Hood, coefficient 
of variation. There is evidence of a strong negative correlation between social capital and 
inequality, although the causal relationship has not been defined, usually social capital 
explains a more equitable income distribution (Coleman, 1988) but in others, income 
inequality explains social capital, for example Knack and Keefer (1997) and Putnam (2000) 
where the decrease in inequality leads to more investment in social capital.  
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Some other studies relate social capital with income measures, for example Boisjoly, Duncan, 
and Hofferth (1995) measure social capital through the monetary and time support received 
by a household from family and friends, they found that people with higher incomes have 
greater access to cash assistance and people with low incomes have greater time help. 
Narayan and Pritchett (1997) estimated social capital with the extent and characteristics of 
people associational activity and their confidence in various institutions and individuals, this 
measure was associated with data from household income in rural communities, they found 
that social capital increases household income. 
 
Other studies relate social capital with inequality measures, for example Kawachi, Kennedy, 
Lochner, and Prothrow-Stith (1997) estimated social capital with solidarity groups’ density 
and the portion of individuals who believe that people could be confident. They inferred that 
investment in social capital reduces income inequality. Robison and Siles (1997) used as 
social capital indicators family integrity (percentage of households with female heads with 
children), educational level (percentage of graduates from high school), crime variables (rates 
of litigation) and employment variables (rates of labour force participation); they found that 
social capital changes have an effect on the level and disparity of household income. 
 
The most common forms of social capital investment consist in sharing a social network. 
These networks can be formed by different types of people with common characteristics and 
have minimum social distance. People who have these characteristics create trust, loyalty and 
cooperation which could lead to flows of information, saving time and resources in physical 
and monetary terms.  
 
There is empirical evidence of social capital investment trough networks built in microcredit 
groups (Knaff and Keefer, 1997, Narayan and Pritchett 1997, Temple and Johnson, 1998; 
Portes, 1995; Karageorgis and Light, 1994, Heller, 1996). These studies show that social 
capital generates information channels, facilitates transactions and reduces costs in these 
credit mechanisms. For example, lack of access to credit for the poor in developing countries 
is a consequence of limited information and the risk that credit applicants imply. Social 
capital allows agreements reducing these problems, even in the presence of imperfect 
information and therefore the credits are provided. Networks and trust attitudes reduce the 
opportunistic behaviour of some community members, for example the peer pressure 
mechanism in microfinance is used to prevent default problems. Using this tools social capital 
will be analyzed and measured. 
 
3. Characteristics of financial exclusion  
 
In Mexico there is limited access to formal banking services and delays in funding. For 
example, financial intermediaries, including banks, are serving less than 40% of the 
population and 77% of users know little about the bank contracts. The alternative of 
expanding the popular financial sector to cover the 60% remaining has had poor results and 
the Popular Savings and Credit Law (LACP) recently approved has created obstacles to 
financial intermediaries that serve this sector. On one hand, the approval has reduced costs but 
also has decreased the flexibility of adaption to the needs of this population1. 
 
                                                          
1
 Survey of Financial Culture in Mexico, 2008. Banamex-UNAM. 
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The microfinance sector has not achieved greater coverage and penetration in Mexico, mainly 
in rural areas, for example 80% of people from rural communities use cash as the only mean 
of payment. The savings system with more penetration is the informal through the Rotating 
Savings and Credit Association or ROSCA, “home savings”, solidarity cooperatives for 
savings and savings with friends and parents. The 69% of the population lacks of information 
on financial products and services. This sector has failed to adapt their products to local 
demands and have problems of past-due loans. 77% of financial services users say they know 
and understand little or nothing of the contracts in this sector, 2 of 10 people surveyed had a 
record of their debts, expenses, income and savings, and 7 of 10 people are not informed 
about services and charges of financial instruments (BANAMEX-UNAM, 2008)
 1
. 
Additionally, the creation of new technologies and products (which is limited) by the financial 
sector has been based on different characteristics of financial infrastructure. 
 
The access to formal financial services is difficult for poor people considering that they don’t 
have guarantees. Banks have no interest in small crops, animals, or appliances. In some cases, 
poor people have an acceptable guarantee (their lands); however, they cannot be used because 
of the lack of a legal property title, the same applies for the mortgage (Mansell, 1995). 
Therefore, banks base their decisions only on the credit history (information missing when 
speaking of poor people) or in the income level (which is usually irregular considering the 
unemployment periods). The lack of information and the credit risk of these borrowers, in 
addition to high interest rates and the situation described above exclude the poor from the 
formal financial markets. 
 
Many times transaction costs may be higher on loans for the poor than for higher income 
individuals because the credit monitoring and contract enforcement are more difficult for the 
poor. Alternatively, lenders raise the interest rates to a certain level
2
 to cover their costs. Thus, 
financial intermediaries in equilibrium ration the credit giving it to customers that imply less 
research and monitoring costs and whose contracts are cheaper to enforce. Even in the 
informal financial sector, interest rates do not balance the markets
3
 and credit rationing exists. 
 
Moreover, the transaction costs which the poor face and the cost in time are both high. As 
there are few intermediaries from the formal financial sector in low-income areas, if poor 
people go to the bank it may cause them a few hours off of work, including them to travel 
long distances by walking, use several transports and, quite possibly, make long lines. It may 
also involve filling forms that are difficult to understand, in addition to time and effort in 
order to gather the required documentation. These reasons explain why low-income borrowers 
are not only excluded from credit markets in the formal sector but also from many informal 
sources of financing. 
 
4. Social capital in the solidarity funds  
 
Social capital in microfinance works through ties of solidarity, neighbourhood and 
community organization, its principal asset is trust (Coleman, 1990) and operates through 
social collaterals, peer monitoring and peer pressure. Mechanisms that foster linkages and 
strengthen their solidarity bonds are self selection, groups of small size, the homogeneity 
among the members and their population density (Bastelaer, 1999). Social capital in 
                                                          
2
The interest rates are raised until the level that the highest marginal rates increase the probability of default, 
which would reduce their profits. 
3
 Sometimes up to 10% per day. 
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microfinance provides substitutes with respect to individual collateral and generates low-cost 
alternatives for lenders. 
 
Social capital is expressed in the solidarity funds on participation and how this financial 
instrument is set up: the producers meet voluntarily to establish funds. The members are 
involved in the process of creation and modification of statutes and operation rules, they are 
also involved in the designing, monitoring and evaluation process, which reduces their costs. 
They decide who can become a member because they have information about the members in 
their communities. 
 
Members are also the owners and responsible for recovery. Using peer monitoring and peer 
pressure schemes can reduce fraud or default problems. The involvement of the members in 
the creation, discussion of operation rules, organization and monitoring enables them to adapt 
to their specific needs and expectations. They participate by attending meetings with all the 
members involved in order to take decisions that concern the group. 
 
Funds representatives are selected in the Members General Assembly by majority vote; their 
positions are honorary in nature and therefore not remunerated for their performance. 
Members can be elected to any administrative post or representation. Through the local credit 
committee they decide who can become a member but they can also deny entry of a person 
when the applicant is known for his dishonesty and disrepute in the community. This selection 
mechanism has a positive effect in preventing risks of fraud or default problems. 
 
The members represent the social guarantee that applicants need to obtain for a loan. For 
example, in the case of solidarity loans members can be the social collateral for loans. Also, 
members are responsible for monitoring the performance of their managers and the use of its 
funds through the supervision boards, management and credit committees. The funds keep a 
record of each member in addition to the books and the registration of members at meetings. 
This monitoring tool allows minimizing fraud and provides security to the members. 
 
The operation system of the funds has its own implicit social oversight mechanism to avoid 
attempted fraud. However, in the case of fraud or default from a member, the board of 
directors decides to temporarily suspend or expel them from the Fund. But the punishment 
goes beyond an economic fraud, it is a social destitution restricting their participation in 
several community activities and limiting their access to the benefits of public services and 
assets created with the resources of the funds. 
 
Responsibility and trust between members allows getting loans without excessive collateral. 
To the extent that customers are also owners and correspondents of the fund administration, it 
reduces the temptation to not pay and reduces the presence of fraud. In case it happens, their 
social system controller can detect them in time. This situation reduces the risk of bankruptcy, 
preventing its spread to other funds from other regions. 
 
On the other hand, the solidarity funds do not have permission from the National Banking and 
Securities Commission (CNBV by its initials in Spanish) to operate as entities of Savings and 
Loan Associations (EACPs by its initials in Spanish) in terms of the Popular Savings and 
Credit Law (LACP by its initials in Spanish) because they are civil societies. They are not 
subject to the approval of the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (SHCP by its initials in 
Spanish), or the inspection and supervision of the CNBV, or are located in the rules of the 
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Savings and Loan Societies (SACPs by its initials in Spanish), but they have auxiliary 
supervision and technical assistance from a Federation
4
 and are considered by the LACP. 
 
The funds have not been able to adjust their operation to the requirements established by the 
LACP; they are not required to comply with prudential rules as they apply only to entities that 
are subject to regulation by the SACPs and CNBV as credit unions or well, as public financial 
institutions like Banrural. 
 
The funds are not SACPs because the requirements are costly and complicated. For example, 
they are obliged to contract managers and administrators with five and ten years of work 
experience, the call for its annual meetings have to be published ten days in advance in the 
newspapers of greatest circulation in the area, and the opening hours are rigid (it opens from 
Monday to Friday and close on weekends). 
 
These requirements are difficult to fulfil in most of the funds. First, because there are 
populations in which the low level of education of its members makes it very difficult to 
secure a staff with technical training. Second, by its geographical dispersion, many of these 
communities have no access to newspapers or the media, and third, regarding the schedule, 
the weekend is the time when the members of the country side and surrounding communities 
come to town, where the offices of the solidarity funds are usually installed. 
 
This status limits the financial development of the funds and prevents them from having the 
backing of the banking authorities, this still is not an obstacle to their development, but may 
be in the future. So, while for internal management, the funds do have statutes and rules of 
operation approved by the membership, it is necessary that they are supported and count with 
an appropriate legislation. In this sense, social capital has a special advantage on the legal 
aspect of the solidarity funds, its mechanisms of operation, supervision and control of funds 
gives them confidence and certainty to the partners on the use and recovery of resources, 
which could not be done otherwise, but because of its legal situation they cannot be governed 
under other statutes, implying a high cost for the funds forcing them in some cases to change 
their social denomination. In this sense, the mechanisms for participation, selection, 
supervision and monitoring act as substitutes for legal mechanisms and oversight. 
 
5. Income transfers and social capital model  
 
Social capital has been estimated through opinion surveys and indirect measures like 
inequality indices such as the Robin Hood index and the coefficient of variation. The results 
have shown that income inequality is negatively associated with social capital, which suggests 
that inequality, through a suitable functional form, can be a proxy of social capital. 
 
In order to find a theoretical proxy of social capital through its relationship with inequality 
there will be used a model that shows the inverse relationship between social capital and 
inequality, through four indexes: Robin Hood, coefficient of variation, Gini and relative 
deprivation. The indicator of social capital consists of the resources offered by a person and 
relates theoretically with a coefficient of sympathy. This represents the degree to which a 
person incorporates the welfare of another in his utility function and that leads to sharing 
resources with other. 
 
                                                          
4
 Federación Nacional de Cajas Solidarias, A.C. 
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In this way, social capital is observed in the transfer of income, as an individual with more 
income is concerned about an individual with less income because there is a relation of 
sympathy between them (if there is positive social capital). The individual with more income 
is interested into raising the welfare of the other with less income by transferring part of his 
income, thus generating a redistribution of income inequality that favours the worst. This 
behaviour is pleasing for both because the higher income individual raises his social capital 
invested in the poorer individual, and therefore his utility, and the individual with less income 
is receiving a transfer. 
 
In this model there are two individuals (i and j) with equal utility functions, Cobb-Douglas 
type. Their functions depend on the final income itself (Ifi) and the final income of another 
individual (Ifj), which in turn depends on the amount of social capital between the two that is 
represented by a coefficient K. If social capital is positive, an increase in the income of 
individual j will give satisfaction to individual i, the opposite happens when social capital is 
negative, when K=0 any change in the income of j is indifferent to i. In this model social 
capital is assumed positive. The following are the utility functions for individuals i and j: 
 
i i j
K
U If If        (1) 
j j i
K
U If If        (2)
  
It is assumed that social capital is equal for i and j individuals (Kij=Kji=K), since the two 
individuals feel sympathy for one another in the same way. The income elasticity is given by 
the social capital coefficient K=(Ui/ Ifj)(Ifj/Ui), and lies between 0 and 1 (0<K<1), i.e. each 
individual appreciates the other, but not as much as they appreciate themselves. If K<1, the 
individual i appreciates more an increase of one percent of its final income than an increase of 
one percent of the final income of the individual j. If K=1, i appreciates the final income of j 
as much as his own income, if K>1 for i the final income of j is more important than its 
personal income, if K=0 individual i does not appreciates j. 
 
The final income of i and j individuals is given by the sum of the initial income (Io) and net 
transfers (Tn), i.e. what an individual has minus the amount of transfers he gives (Ifi=Ioi+Tni 
and Ifj=Ioj+Tnj). These net transfers consist of transfers received (Tr) minus transfers given 
(Tt) (Tni=Tri-Tti and Tnj=Trj-Ttj). Individuals will only differ from each other by their initial 
incomes, i.e., at the beginning there is inequality in their allocation of income. 
  
In this model it is assumed zero transaction costs, i.e. transfers which gives the individual i are 
equal to the transfers received by individual j, in turn, transfers received from the individual i 
are equal to those granted by the individual j (Trj=Tti and Tri=Ttj). In this model, the total 
income of individuals does not change, otherwise income distribution could be affected by 
factors other than transfers, therefore, the income of the economy is fixed, the amount of final 
incomes of i and j is equal to the total income of the economy (It=Ifi+Ifj). In this economy, 
each individual transfers part of his income to another according to his preferences, thus 
generating a reallocation of income. The following explains the distribution graphically. 
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Diagram 1 
Ij
Ii
B
Ui
Ifj
Ifi
Ioj
Ioi
Trj
Tti Ioi+Ioj=It
A
 
Point A shows the initial allocation of income. In point B the individual i, according to its 
preferences decided to transfer part of his income to the individual j, which changed the 
distribution increasing the income of j and decreasing the income of i. The line It is the sum 
of individuals’ incomes and is equal to the total income of the economy. If there is no social 
capital, the individual i is not worried about the individual j and the distribution would be 
equal to the original allocation located at point A, but because i feels sympathy for j, then i is 
concerned by j and tries to benefit him by transferring part of his income, thus changing the 
original distribution of income, standing now at the point B. If the final distribution has 
incorporated social capital, this could mean that the distribution is an indirect measure of 
social capital. Thus, the social capital measure is the change of the initial distribution with 
respect to the final distribution, i.e. the difference between A and B. 
 
On the other hand, the only thing an individual can control are the transfers granted (Tt). The 
initial income (Io) and the transfers received (Tr) are exogenous, and then the variable that 
will determine the model is Tt. Therefore, the maximization problem arises in terms of 
transfers granted. Substituting the final income and net transfer equations in the utility 
function of each individual will get the problem of maximization of i and j. 
                           
iTt
MaxU Io Tr Tt Io Tt Tti i i i j i j
k
                               
                           
jTt
MaxU Io Tr Tt Io Tt Ttj j j j i j i
k
      
 
The first order conditions (Ui/Tti and Uj/Ttj) are as follows: 
               


i
i
j i j
k
i i i j i j
KU
Tt
Io Tt Tt Io Tr Tt Io Tt TtK         
1
0  
               


j
j
i j i
K
j j j i j i
KU
Tt
Io Tt Tt Io Tr Tt Io Tt TtK         
1
0  
Substituting again the final income of i and j individuals in the first order conditions gives the 
following optimization conditions. 
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For   i       IfIf
If
If
ji
i
j
KK  or                                  
For   j       IfIf
If
If
ij
j
i KK  or                                  
Just one of these two conditions applies. If there is inequality, the individual who has more 
income gives transfers and the individual with less income is the receiver. In this model it is 
not possible that the two individuals transfer their income at the same time. The following are 
the transfer’s allocation from i to j (diagram 2) and from j to i (diagram 3). 
 
Diagram 2                                                                   Diagram 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Considering the optimization condition of i, individual i cannot receive income from j, the 
only thing he can do is to transfer part of his income to j moving from right to left on the line 
of total income. The optimization condition of i is at point Bi (Ifj=KIfi). The line where point 
Bi is located is different to the curve of 45° because the individual is concerned about the 
other, but more about himself, i.e. K is smaller than one. The initial income of j is at point A. 
 
If the initial income of j was at point Bi, then i would no longer need to transfer part of his 
income to j. But if the endowment income of j is at a point on the right of the optimization 
condition of i, individual i can continue granting to j until point Bi. In the event that the initial 
income of j is above the condition of maximization, i cannot continue to grant transfers to j 
because that would be to move away from point Bi
5
. Therefore, in the dotted line, which is 
above of the optimal point Bi, i will not transfer income to j. This is shown in the following 
equations: 
                              
0I
0I


TtIoIo
TtIoIo
iij
iij
Kf
Kf
 
                                                          
5
 If the endowment income of j is found to the left of A, and i would like to move from left to right transferring 
income to j to reach his optimal point, this would be like stealing income to j, producing a reduction of j’s 
income that instead of helping him it would hurt him. This behavior of i to j shows negative social capital. 
 
 
45° 
Ij 
Bi 
Ii 
IfiK=Ifj 
Ifi=Ifj 
Ioj 
Ioi 
A 
Ifi 
Ifj 
 
Bj 
A 
45° 
Ij 
IfjK=Ifi 
Ii 
Ifi=Ifj 
Ioj 
Ioi Ifi 
Ifj 
 13 
 
When there is social capital and j feels sympathy for i, j will transfer to i, so reducing his 
income by moving from left to right on the line of total income (It). His condition 
optimization is in the point Bj (Ifi=KIfj). This behaviour is shown in Diagram 3. In the case of 
j, where the initial income of i is above the optimization condition of j, as in A, then j will 
transfer part of his income to i, but if the initial income of i is below the point Bj, j will not 
transfer income to i because if he did, he will move away from the maximization condition, 
Hence on the dotted line that is below Bj, individual j will not transfer to i. This is shown in 
the following equations: 
                                
0
0I


TtIoIo
TtIoIo
jji
jji
KIf
Kf
 
In the pre-conditions for maximization of Bi and Bj, where i transferred income to j and j to i, 
there is a relationship between social capital and inequality, in these areas one individual 
transfers to another and to be able to carry out such a transfer there should be a sympathetic 
relationship in which one wants to improve the other. In addition, if it happens an inequality 
situation is necessary, where one has more income than another and wants to benefit the other 
transferring some part of his own income. 
 
Diagram 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The areas where there is a relationship between inequality and social capital are located in the 
spaces above the conditions of optimization, not dotted areas of the total income line. In the 
dotted area, although there is social capital between i and j, there is no relation between social 
capital and inequality because there is no imbalance which encourages both i and j to transfer 
income away from the optimum. 
 
In the area located to the right of Bi, where individual i transfers part of his income to j, an 
optimization condition of i is achieved and j condition is irrelevant because it cannot be 
reached. In the same way, in the area that lies to the left of Bj, where j transfers to i, the 
maximization condition of j is reached, but i’s condition is irrelevant. The dotted area 
represents both incomes and their conditions can be achieved. If one condition applies the 
other does not, therefore, only one condition can be observed at a time. Thus, the case of 
individual i can be analyzed, which transfers income to j. 
 Ij 
IfjK=Ifi 
Bj 
Bi 
Ii 
IfiK=Ifj 
It=Ioi+Ioj 
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Previously, the final income of individual i was defined as follows: Ifi=Ioi+Tri-Tti, but 
considering the case where only the optimization condition of i applied, i only transfers 
income and receives no transfers. Then his received transfers are zero and his final income is 
as follows: Ifi=Ioi-Tti. Considering the individual j case, j only receives transfers from i and 
grants none, then transfers granted from j are zero and his final income is: Ifj=Ioj+Trj. So in 
the case where only the i’s condition apply, the transfers that i grants are the transfers that j 
receives, so the transfers are redefined as T and final incomes of i and j are as follows Ifi=Ioi-
T and Ifj=Ioj+T. Substituting these equations in the optimization condition of i the transfers 
given by i and received by j are obtained: 
 
             T
K
K
i jIo Io


1
                               
 
Furthermore, by substituting this equation in Ifi=Ioi-T and redefining the total income as 
It=Ioi+Ioj, final income of i is obtained, which depends on the total income and the sympathy 
coefficient Ifi=[It/(1+K)], in the same way by replacing the transfers equation in Ifj=Ioj+T 
final income of j is obtained, it is expressed as follows Ifj=[KIt/(1+K)]. The final average 
income of the two individuals involved in this economy is given by    = (Ifi+Ifj)/2. Now, 
different income inequality indexes are incorporated to the model to observe the relationship 
of social capital with inequality. These indexes are: the Robin Hood index, the coefficient of 
variation, the Gini index and the index of relative deprivation. These indexes were selected 
based on the argument that the gap between rich and poor is contributing to lower levels of 
social cohesion and trust (Kawachi, et. al., 1997) and that inequality causes a feeling of envy 
and injustice that discourages investment in social capital (Podder, 1996)
 6
. 
 
Robin Hood Index 
 
The Robin Hood Index is defined as the proportion of aggregate income to be transferred 
from households above the median income to the households located below the mean in order 
to achieve equality in income distribution (Atkinson, 1992). Thus, the Robin Hood index in 
this economy is as follows: RH=Ifi-     in the case of individual i. Substituting the equations of 
final income and average income in the Robin Hood index, it is expressed as follows: 
RH=(Ifj-Ifj)/2. Now considering the final income of i and j in the Robin Hood index, it is 
redefined as follows: RH=0.5*{[(1-K)It]/(1+K)}. The Robin Hood index in absolute terms 
corresponds to RH=(Ifj-Ifj)/2, in relative terms it is given by the ratio of the index and the 
total income (rh=RH/It). So replacing the equation of the RH index found in the relative 
Robin Hood index it is obtained the following result: rh=0.5*[(1-K)/(1+K)]. 
 
Thus, the Robin Hood index shows a negative relationship between social capital and 
inequality: the higher social capital between i and j is, the lower income inequality in this 
economy will be. Social capital is then defined in terms of inequality resulting the following 
equation: K=[1-(2*rh)]/[1+(2*rh)]. In this equation, the maximum value of the rh index is a 
                                                          
6
  “There is a direct relationship between the degree of inequality and the extension of the injustice sense in 
society with consequent dissatisfaction that causes conflicts of class," this sense of injustice caused by inequality 
hinders social collaboration for the welfare and discourages investment in social capital. 
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half because there are only two individuals in this economy, i.e. if an individual had 100% of 
income it should withdraw the 50% and move to another individual to reach perfect equality. 
If there are a large number of individuals, the maximum value of the Robin Hood index tends 
to one because it has to be redistributed the 100% of income if an individual is concentrating 
all the income. Therefore the formula for large populations related with social capital is the 
following: 
      K
rh
rh



1
1
                                                         
 
From this definition, an inverse relationship between social capital and inequality is observed, 
as measured by the Robin Hood Index. It is noteworthy that the relationship between these 
two variables is nonlinear; an approximation could be a logarithmic functional relationship in 
which social capital grows more rapidly than the decrease on the Robin Hood index. 
 
Coefficient of variation 
 
On the other hand, the coefficient of variation is the standard deviation between the average 
incomes; it can be defined as follows: 
     1
1
2
1
2 








 

n
i
i
Ifn
CV
If
                                                 
 
Substituting equations Ifi=[It/(1+K)] and Ifj=[KIt/(1+K)] in the equation above would result 
in the following equation: CV
2
=(0.5*{It
2
/[(1+K)
2
*If
2
]+(K
2
*It
2
)/[(1+K)
2
*If
2
]})-1. Since 
It
2   2=n2 and n=2, then the equation above would be defined as follows: 
CV
2
={0.5*[4/(1+K)
2
+ (K
2
*4)/(1+K)
2
]}-1. Then social capital could be expressed in terms of 
the coefficient of variation. 
CV
CV
K



1
1
                                                       
It is important to observe the similarity between the equation of social capital obtained from 
the Robin Hood index and the results from the coefficient of variation, both equations 
coincide because this economy consists of two individuals. Now, obtaining the first order 
condition from CV
2
=0.5*{4/(1+K)
2
+ (K
2
*4)/(1+K)
2
}-1 we obtain the following expression: 
δCV2 δK=-[4/(1+K)3]+[(4*K2)/(1+K)3] +[(4*K)/(1+K)2].  From this expression it is inferred 
that if K 0, i do not appreciate an increase in the final income of j, then  CV2/ K<0, i.e. a 
decline in social capital brings an increase in inequality, represented by the coefficient of 
variation. Moreover, if K=1, i appreciates the final income of j as much as his income, then 
CV2/ K=0. From these it follows that at any point in the range 0 <K <1, K increases if CV 
decreases. 
 
Gini Index 
 
The Gini index is the average relative distance of each individual with respect to the other; 
this can be expressed as follows: 
 
G
If n
If If
i
n
i j
j
n
  
1 1 1
22
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Incorporating the equations Ifi=[It/(1+K)] and Ifj=[KIt/(1+K)]  in the above equation gives the 
following expression: G=(1/    )*(1/4){[It/(1+K)]-[(KIt)/(1+K)]}. Developing the equation it is 
obtained the following relationship between social capital and inequality: K=(1-2G)/(1+2G). 
As in the Robin Hood index, the outcome for this equation is given for two individuals, 
generalizing for n individuals it would be obtained the following expression: 
 K
G
G



1
1
      
Again, social capital remains an inverse relationship with inequality, such behaviour shows a 
nonlinear relationship, like the Robin Hood index and the coefficient of variation. 
 
Relative Deprivation Index 
 
This index is an economic measure of relative deprivation; it shows the envy feeling through 
economic inequality. Empirical studies that have used this index relate this to social cohesion 
as social capital measure. Considering the case of two individuals, when an individual with 
envy feelings is compared with another that has no envy it arises a sense of relative 
deprivation (PR). Equality is the ideal state of society, but if there are disparities between 
individuals, then it is perceived disadvantage in the sense of relative deprivation. 
 
This index does not show the same upper limits as the other indexes. In the three indexes 
above, the maximum (M) is achieved when an individual receives all the income, but in the 
relative deprivation index, the maximum is somewhere in an interior point between the upper 
and lower limits of the inequality. This is because individuals are not compared with the 
individual who possesses all the income, but with the situation of the other he feels envy. 
Considering this, the relative deprivation index (IPR) would be expressed as follows
7
: 












 1
2
ln
2
lnln where,
2
n
Itn
MandPR
M
PR
IPR IfIf
ji
           
In the equation represented by M, Ii<Ij, i is the individual who is disadvantaged in this 
economy, he is the one who expresses the sense of relative deprivation. Because n = 2 in this 
economy, then M=ln(It-1). Now incorporating the incomes of i and j individuals in equations 
Ifi=[It/(1+K)] and Ifj=[KIt/(1+K)] and the maximum value (M) for n = 2, the IPR would be as 
follows : IPR={ln[It/(1+K)]- ln[ItK/(1+K)]}/ln(It-1). The social capital in terms of the relative 
deprivation index could be expressed as follows: 
 
K
It
IPR

1
1
                                                    
There is also an inverse relationship between social capital and the relative deprivation index, 
but this relationship is different from that presented by the Robin Hood Index, the coefficient 
of variation and the Gini index, this is due to the difference that exists in their maximum 
values. Although the equations obtained an inverse association between social capital and 
inequality is inferred a causality is assumed as follows KS= f (Inequality) based on the 
arguments of Kawachi, et. al. (1997) and Podder (1996). 
  
6. Estimation of the social capital indicator  
 
                                                          
7
 Podder, Nripesh, “Relative deprivation, envy ad Economic Inequality”, KYKLOS, vol. 49, 1996, Fasc. 3, pp. 
353-376, equations 8, 13 y 15.  
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The similarities of social capital with other types of capital suggest that social capital can be 
studied with standard economic tools, i.e. investment in social capital can be seen as an 
economic problem of allocating resources. Social capital is measured by its association with 
other variables using the extrapolation method (Heckman and Vytlacil, 2000a. 2002; 
Heckman et al. 1990). This method is considered for the analysis period (1994) because there 
is no statistical information of social capital at a state level or municipality level, which is the 
maximum level of disaggregation used, and it is necessary to get social capital information at 
the municipality level to discuss the financial information for each of the solidarity funds. 
 
In the estimations of social capital, there were used two methods, the first is derived from the 
model developed and has the following functional form: KS=(1-D)/(1+D) where D is any of 
the inequality indexes listed in the theoretical model. The second method concerns the 
estimation of an equation that incorporates social capital indicators and indexes of inequality 
and also shows a negative relationship between social capital and inequality: KS=1 + 2 
Inequality+u.  
 
Indicators of social capital were obtained from the World Values Survey for 76 countries with 
market economies from the waves of the periods 1981-1984, 1989-1993, 1994-1999 and 
1999-2004. These surveys were used because they include the period of analysis, the period 
for which solidarity funds information is obtained. Social capital indicators were built from 
the following questionnaire questions: Do you trust in others? The answers are:  most people 
can trust, young people trust in older people, older people trust in young people. Other 
questions are: do you trust in other people in your country?, how much do you trust your 
family, confidence on churches, armed forces, education system, the press, the government, 
among others?, do you belong to voluntary, ecology, human rights and social welfare among 
others groups?. A pooling with the different waves was made generating a size sample of 201 
countries. 
 
Indicators of social capital were based on Coleman (1990), Fukuyama (1995), Putnam (1993) 
and Gellner (1994) who believe that social capital contributes to better development of the 
institutions either at macro or micro level. They point out that trust promotes cooperation 
between people and this produces a better development of the institutions because of the 
active participation of citizens to collaborate, monitor, critique and limit restrict predatory 
tendencies positively affecting their performance. This article analyses the social capital 
influence in microfinance institutions such as solidarity funds. 
 
After making some estimates and statistical tests described below, it was found that only the 
trust indicator was statistically significant, this is why it is the only indicator used. The trust 
indicator was built using the percentage of people in a country that answered "must people 
can be trusted" to the question: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be 
trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?”. For the countries 
reported, the average value was 28.6% and the standard deviation was 13.5. To construct the 
indicators of inequality were used the percentage share of household income, by percentile 
group of household from the annual world development reports of the World Bank, according 
to the quintile in which the units are located to each of the 201 countries surveyed for a near 
period to the mentioned waves. 
 
It was built a pooling data from the 4 waves used for the survey periods 1981-1984, 1989-
1993, 1994-1999 and 1999-2004 to generate a sample with 201 observations, taking into 
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account the countries that were reported in either survey. In order to test whether the 
construction of the pooling was statistically significant, dummies variables were tested for 
periods of time considered in the model. Social capital was estimated using inequality indexes 
for the period mentioned with three dummies variables for the periods 1989-1993, 1994-1999 
and 1999-2004 (LnKS=1+2Inequality+3Dummy+u). These dummies were not 
significant, so we can expect that the union of the period mentioned does not create problems 
in the estimation of social capital. 
 
To test the relationship between social capital and income inequality, the following equation 
was estimated: LnKS= 1 + 2LnInequality+u, where LnKs is the natural logarithm of the 
social capital variable built with the indicators described above. Control variables were used 
to control country heterogeneity; these were: education level
8
, political corruption, gender, 
age ranges, household stable relationship, household ownership, money saved in the past 
year
9
, population and real GDP. These variables were chosen based on Brown and Ashman 
(1996); Fox (1994); Tendler and Freedheim (1994); Aldridge, Halpern et al (2002) and 
Pantoja (1999)
10
. We used the logarithmic form because there is theoretical evidence for the 
existence of a nonlinear relationship. The results obtained with OLS were: 
 
Estimations of the social capital indicator with five inequality indexes 
 
Trust = 1 + 2Inequality+…+nXn+u
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Independent variables 
 
I II III IV V 
Gini1 -0.3510*** 
(0.1028) 
    
Gini2  -0.3493*** 
(0.0897) 
   
CV   -16.1594*** 
(5.5961) 
  
Robin Hood    -0.4280*** 
(0.1497) 
 
IPR     -0.2728*** 
(0.0952) 
Education middle -0.1086* 
(0.0537) 
-0.0339 
(0.0580) 
-0.0337 
(0.0584) 
-0.0330 
(0.0585) 
-0.0346 
(0.0584) 
Education upper 0.1644* 
(0.0796) 
0.1551* 
(0.0937) 
0.1502* 
(0.0953) 
0.1523* 
(0.0952) 
0.1595* 
(0.0947) 
Political corruption -0.1075* 
(0.0668) 
-0.1390*** 
(0.0669) 
-0.1399*** 
(0.0671) 
-0.1407*** 
(0.0671) 
-0.1333** 
(0.0673) 
                                                          
8
 In the estimation was not used low educational level to avoid multicolinelity problems, as did the age range and 
gender. 
9
 Endogeneity problems were identified; for this a temporal instrumental variable was used named “save many 
last year”, this is related with trust level, it was statistically significant. 
10
 Brown and Ashman (1996); Fox (1994); Tendler and Freedheim (1994). Aldridge, Halpern et al (2002) 
suggest that social capital can be generated in the short term to support political and economic development, they 
found that the main determinants of social capital include: history and culture; whether social structures are flat 
or hierarchical; the family; education; the built environment; residential mobility; economic inequalities and 
social class; the strength and characteristics of civil society; and patterns of individual consumption and personal 
values. Pantoja (1999) identified: family and kinship connections; wider social networks of associational life 
covers the full range of formal and informal horizontal arrangements; networks; political society; institutional 
and policy framework which includes the formal rules and norms that regulate public life; and social norms and 
values. 
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Sex (male) 0.1420 
(0.3343) 
0.2978 
(0.3318) 
0.2928 
(0.3399) 
0.3014 
(0.3398) 
0.3250 
(0.3388) 
Age (15-29 years old) -0.1332 
(0.1260) 
-0.0272 
(0.1328) 
-0.0263 
(0.1401) 
-0.0294 
(0.1400) 
-0.0326 
(0.1392) 
Age (30-49 years old) -0.0272 
(0.1546) 
-0.0283 
(0.1560) 
-0.0228 
(0.1565) 
-0.0265 
(0.1566) 
-0.0420 
(0.1566) 
Stable relationship -0.0402* 
(0.0428) 
-0.1014*** 
(0.0505) 
-0.1023** 
(0.0516) 
-0.1021** 
(0.0516) 
-0.1022** 
(0.0516) 
Household ownership 0.2259* 
(0.1410) 
0.1160*** 
(0.0533) 
0.1102*** 
(0.0536) 
0.1142*** 
(0.0535) 
0.1224*** 
(0.0535) 
Save money past year 0.0734* 
(0.0777) 
-0.0608* 
(0.0880) 
-0.0566* 
(0.0884) 
-0.0592* 
(0.0885) 
-0.0681* 
(0.0888) 
Population 0.0006*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0010*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0009*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0010*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0010*** 
(0.0001) 
GDP real 0.00001*** 
(0.000004) 
0.00002*** 
(0.000004) 
0.00002*** 
(0.000004) 
0.00002*** 
(0.000004) 
0.00002*** 
(0.000004) 
Constant 30.5899 
(16.0671) 
16.3851 
(15.6772) 
15.2458 
(16.5097) 
15.5932 
(16.5496) 
14.1325 
(16.4541) 
N 144 133 132 132 132 
R
2
 0.5075 0.5316 0.5429 0.5322 0.5324 
R Adjusted 0.4624 0.4847 0.4858 0.4851 0.4852 
F 11.25 11.35 11.48 11.28 11.29 
F-prob 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
The Gini2 is referred to the adjusted Gini by population. The terms in parenthesis are referred to the values of 
the standard errors. Significance levels are ***(99%), **(95%) and  *(90%).  
 
The estimation was conducted using the five indexes mentioned above and the values of 
social capital indicator from the World Values Surveys for the countries reported, this was 
done in order to ascertain the best estimate of social capital. Only in the estimation of the trust 
indicator among the five estimators of inequality considered were significant (the coefficient 
of variation, the Gini1 index, the Gini2 index, the Robin Hood and the Relative Deprivation 
indexes), the remainder of the estimated social capital indexes were not significant (they were 
mentioned above). The five inequality indexes were significant, but the CV showed better 
statistical estimators. Then the coefficient of variation index shows best statistical results and 
hence was selected as the best index to estimate the social capital variable.  
 
Once the best indicator of social capital (trust) and the best proxy for estimating the social 
capital (the coefficient of variation) was found, the social capital for Mexico was estimated at 
the state level using the values of the coefficient of variation for the country. The coefficient 
of variation for Mexico was built using information from the total current income of 
households by deciles from the National Surveys of Income and Expenditure of Households 
comparable (1984, 1989, 1992, 1994 and 1996).  
 
The estimate of the method 1 incorporated the coefficient of variation into the equation K = 
(1-CV / 1 + CV) to get the values of the social capital for each year. This equation is derived 
from the indicator obtained through the theoretical model. In Method 2 the trust variable was 
estimated, which represents the social capital. For this, the coefficient of variation and the 
values obtained from the coefficients β1 and β2 in the estimation of the equation number III 
pointed out above were incorporated into the equation LnTrust=1+2LnCV+u. LnTrust is a 
nonlinear indicator and represents the trust variable. The results with both methods are 
presented in the following table: 
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Estimations of social capital for Mexico under the two methods 
Year of the 
ENIGH 
Variation 
Coefficient 
Method 1 
K=(1-CV
1
)/(1+CV
1
) 
Method 2 
Trust = 1 + 2 CV+u 
1984 0.8703 0.3725 22.32 
1989 1.0141 0.3049 16.85 
1992 1.0251 0.3000 16.49 
1994 1.0333 0.2963 16.23 
1996 0.9746 0.3228 18.21 
Source: INEGI, National Survey of Income and Expenditure of Household, 1984, 1989, 1992, 1994 and 
1996.              
1
 There was used the adjusted coefficient of variation for this calculations. It was obtained from the 
functional form of the theoretical model.  
 
The results of social capital obtained under the first method are related to the percentage of 
sympathy that people feel and is represented by the KS parameter from the utility function 
and correspond to an index in which a value of zero percent means that there is no social 
capital and one percent means that households have as much sympathy for others as for 
themselves. Regarding the second method, the values obtained are related to the percentage of 
households that trust others, for example, in 1996, 18.21% percent of households reported by 
the ENIGH trusted people, i.e. they have social capital. 
 
The results show the following trends: from 1984 to 1994 the coefficient of variation was 
increasing even in marginal terms, but this increase was shrinking. In the same way, the social 
capital estimated under the two methods was decreasing but in smaller proportion, from 1994 
to 1996 the coefficient of variation decreased and social capital, estimated under the two 
methods increased. Therefore there is a similar trend in the behaviour of the social capital 
estimated under the two methods and an inverse relationship between social capital and 
inequality. 
 
Once national results were reported, the social capital for the states was estimated with the 
two methods, but only for two years: 1990 and 1995. These years were used because only in 
these years the income data are available for the states and they are the closest years for which 
statistics are available in the balances reported by the solidarity funds. The information 
corresponds to the XI General Census of Population and Housing 1990 and the Population 
and Housing Count 1995 from the INEGI. 
 
Income information obtained from these two sources concerns the population distribution by 
income groups according to minimum wages, from which the proportions of income 
generating the Coefficient Variation were built. Below are two diagrams showing the 
behaviour of social capital in these two years, estimated with the two methods described. 
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Diagram 5 
Behaviour of the social capital by states in 1990, 
estimation made with the two methods  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: INEGI, XI General Census of Population and Housing, 1990. 
 
The results of this diagram where built with the social capital estimation under the two 
methods: in method 1 the coefficient of variation of each state was incorporated into the 
equation K= (1-CV /1+CV), method 2 incorporates the coefficient of variation of each state 
and the values of the estimators 1 and 2 were imputed in the equation LnTrust = 1 + 2 
LnCV+u. Diagram 5 shows the same behaviour of the social capital under the two methods. 
In 1990, the five states that showed the highest social capital under the two methods were 
(from highest to lowest) Baja California, Sonora, Colima, Baja California Sur and Sinaloa, 
and those that presented the lowest social capital were (from lowest to highest) Chiapas, 
Oaxaca, Zacatecas, Puebla and Guerrero. The interpretation of the social capital value under 
the first method refers to the percentage of sympathy people from each Mexican state feel. 
Under the second method, social capital values refer to the percentage of population of each 
Mexican state that trusts on people. 
Diagram 6 
Behaviour of the social capital by states in 1995, 
estimation made with the two methods  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: INEGI, Counting of Population and Housing, 1995. 
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In 1995, the five states that showed the highest social capital under the two methods were 
(from highest to lowest) Baja California, Mexico, Baja California Sur, Sonora and Nuevo 
Leon, and those with the lowest social capital were (minor to high) Chiapas, Oaxaca, 
Guerrero, Campeche and Yucatan. 
 
In Diagram 6 was observed, as in Diagram 5, similar behaviour in the percentages reported 
under the two methods used for estimating social capital, i.e. the states with greater inequality 
also have less social capital. Additionally, an inverse relationship between inequality and 
social capital for periods from 1984 to 1994 was observed, the coefficient of variation 
increased and the estimated social capital fell. From 1994 to 1996, inequality declined and 
social capital increased. Thus, the years in which the highest inequality was presented were 
also the years with lowest investment in social capital. It can be inferred that social capital at 
the state level coincides in their trends and their relationship with inequality under these two 
different methods in the two periods analyzed. Then, social capital can be estimated using an 
inequality index as proxy. 
 
7. Financial productivity of social capital: development of hypotheses  
 
Literature shows evidence on the productivity of social capital in the sense that it makes 
possible to achieve certain resources that could not be achieved in its absence or could do so 
only at great cost. In microfinance, social capital enables poor peasants to financial services; it 
helps to achieve financial sustainability by increasing their recoveries and reducing costs. To 
test this argument, productivity is measured through the financial products offered by the 
solidarity funds: loans and savings. The performance of the solidarity funds is estimated by 
debt recoveries. 
 
In order to prove that social capital is productive in Solidarity funds, it is analyzed the effect 
of social capital (associated with the members, their bearers) in the loans allocation, deposits 
and the loan recoveries. For this purpose, the following hypotheses are explored: a) social 
capital affects the solidarity funds productivity, and b) social capital affects the financial 
performance of the solidarity funds. 
 
1. One way to explain the productivity is through costs reduction and financial sustainability, 
this is done by expanding products, so as to generate economies of scale and the average 
cost of serving many small transactions begins to decrease and yields to rise (Johnson and 
Rogaly, 1997). The fact that social capital is productive in the solidarity funds means that 
there is a relationship between the outputs and inputs of the solidarity funds. The products 
supplied by the solidarity funds are loans and savings. The inputs are the loan assets 
integrated by the equity and savings. Members are also inputs because they are the bearers 
of social capital. The relations between outputs and inputs are as follows: 
a) The loans assets depend on the loanable funds and the social capital. 
i. Loanable funds consist of equity and savings. When the solidarity funds back 
their loans with savings, dependency can be avoided creating a greater chance of 
achieving long-term viability (Mansell, 1995). On the other hand, because equity 
resource belongs to the members, it represents a healthy way to finance and 
support the loans. Thus, the more equity and savings, the greater the loans and 
hence financial viability will be greater. 
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ii. Social capital contributes for the approval of loans and hence the loans 
allocation, those reducing the transaction costs because of the information flow 
provided with this resource. 
b) Savings depend on the equity and social capital. Since each solidarity fund maintains 
its own active and passive interest rates, although these are very similar to the market 
and they are determined periodically by the Administration Board, there are variations 
in rates between fund and fund, this prevents to have registers of the interest rates. For 
this reason, it is considered that savings just depend on equity and social capital. 
i. Regarding equity, the greater equity the greater the resources available to provide 
financial services, in this case to capture savings or deposits. 
ii. It can be expected that savings and investment depend on social capital because 
there is greater trust from the members to the funds, this could allow increasing 
the deposits, which will generate greater financial products. 
2. Social capital affects the financial performance of the solidarity funds. The recovered 
loans are one of the most important indicators of performance. Achieving high rates of 
recovery is a necessary condition for a sustainable microfinance scheme. Loan losses 
represent the largest cost incurred and the main cause of insolvency, lack of liquidity and 
dependence on government subsidies (Jacob, 1994). It is considered that recovery depends 
on the following relationships: 
a) The recoveries of the borrowed funds are dependent on average loans and social 
capital. 
i. One of the main incentives for borrowers to pay their loans is the expectation that 
in doing so they will have greater access to credit. But if the program starts to 
indiscriminate excessive, lending it is less likely to recover (Mansell, 1995). 
Therefore, it is expected that loans and average recoveries relates in an inverted 
parabola form, i.e. higher average loan increases recoveries, but they reach a point 
where with a larger amount of loans control is lost and the recoveries are reduced 
rather than increased. 
ii. Social capital, through its components: peer pressure and peer monitoring, allows 
the loans recovery. Thus, the higher social capital the higher loans recoveries will 
be. 
 
8. Definition of the econometric equations  
 
The hypothesis will be tested by estimating three equations which imply relations between the 
dependent variables (production and performance) and independent variables (equity, social 
capital and average loans). To test the first hypothesis, social capital is productive; the 
services offered by the solidarity funds (savings and loans) are estimated through productivity 
equations represented by a Cobb Douglas
11
 type of production as follows: 
 
Y A X X 1 21 2
 
 
 
where Y refers to the product offering the solidarity funds, X1 is the input given by the amount 
of fund resources and X2 is the social capital associated with the producers. By replacing the 
outputs Ys and inputs Xs and applying logarithms, the following functions are obtained: 
                                                          
11
 It was considered a Cobb Douglas function because two characteristics: constant returns to scale (homogeneity 
of degree 1) and the marginal productivity which is positive and decreasing i.e. marginal returns of productive 
inputs. 
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    utalSocialCapiembersLnavingsEquityLnCoansLn  *MSL
21
        (1) 
    utalSocialCapiembersLnLnCavingsLn  *MEquityS
21
                         (2) 
 
Products are given by the number of loans and the number of savings. The number, not the 
amount, is considered because the fund transactions reflect the number of operations 
performed and not the amount. For example, a producer may receive a loan of 500 pesos, but 
5 people may receive a loan of 100 pesos. The second operation involves more transaction 
costs than the first and this does not mean that the number of transactions being carried out is 
less. 
 
A production function with constant returns to scale
12
 is proposed; the factors coefficients 
represent the elasticities. In equation (1) the product depends on the amount of resources 
available to loan, these come from the equity and the amount of savings. In equation (2) the 
product depends on the equity. The two equations depend on the social capital that is 
embodied by the producers, more producers in the solidarity fund strengthens the Fund's 
social capital. 
 
To test the second hypothesis, social capital affects the financial performance of the solidarity 
funds, it is used an equation that considers recoveries. It is introduced a squared term because 
it assumes a parabolic relationship where it is expected a positive relationship between the 
average recoveries and loans and a negative relationship with average loans squared. This 
variable was included because it captures the trend in the average loan and recoveries after 
reaching the peak. The proposed equation is the following: 
 
uM*Capital SocialRecoveries
3
2
21
 embersLoansAverageLoansAverageC         (3) 
 
Recoveries are related to the amount of loans paid, the average loan is related to the amount 
of resources allocated for producers and social capital is again a variable incorporated in the 
number of producers. 
 
It is expected a positive relationship between the average loans and the recoveries because the 
highest average loans, the greater incentives producers will have to increase recoveries (it 
refers to the tiered system of credits). The system works as follows, loans are granted to 
producers, if they pay their loans they are candidates for higher credit, but if they do not pay 
or incur in moratorium, they are not eligible to apply for another loan. Thus, the funds can 
allocate loans to the highest point where they can control the recoveries, beyond that limit 
average loans instead of representing an incentive to the recoveries it may cause frauds and 
decapitalization for the funds. The highest point is the following: 
 
                                                          
12
 Production increases in the same proportion that inputs increase Xi and Xj. The existence of constant returns 
to scale allows considering the inputs returns according to their marginal productivity, ie: Y = Pmgxi Xi + Pmgxj 
Xj. In the case of decreasing returns to scale (Y < Pmgxi Xi + Pmgxj Xj)  production would increase by less than 
the input, therefore, the product would be insufficient to make payments to those factors according to their 
marginal productivity, and respect to increasing returns to scale the product would be greater than that payment. 
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0A2
Recoveries
21



Loansverage
LoansAverage
  
Solving the equation it is obtained the maximum value of the average loans, which is a 
function of the estimators 1 and 2. 
        


2
1
2
loansofrecoveriesaverage themaximizesV thatalue  
On the other hand, social capital acts as an advocate for recoveries by selecting the best 
candidates for credit through information flows, peer pressure and peer monitoring. Thus, it is 
expected that a greater investment in social capital allows greater loan recoveries. The 
variables used in equations (1), (2) y (3) are described as follows: 
 
a) LLoans. Are the loans logarithms and are of two types: a) automatic loans and b) 
solidarity loans allocated with the approval of a voluntary endorsement. 
b) LLending Funds. Refers to the sum of the equity and the amount of savings in current 
pesos. The equity is comprised of three funds: a) the general reserve contributes to 
financial autonomy of the funds and could be used to provide loans, b) contingency 
fund is used to cover any eventuality regarding a financial deficit of the fund, and c) 
promotion and social development is used to support community projects. The amount 
of savings relates the resources from the deposits of members through the various 
accounts that record the funds. 
c) LSocialKT.  It refers to the social capital indicator that was built with the 1st. method 
K = (1-CV) / (1 + CV) using the adjusted coefficient of variation. The term describes 
the relationship between this input and their carriers, SocialKT = social capital 
*producers.  
d) LSavings. Refers to the number of transactions from the various savings accounts that 
record the funds as current accounts, systematic savings, youth savings and time 
deposits. 
e) LEquity. It refers to equity described above. 
f) Recoveries. It refers to the total amount of recoveries that are obtained from the loans 
allocated and is the difference between loans allocated and current loans. The current 
loans are those offered by the Funds and are payable in whole or in part, it includes the 
default loans but excludes the overdue loans. 
g) Average Loans. The amount of loans given divided by the number of members in each 
solidarity fund. 
 
The information of the indicators was obtained from the financial results reported by the 
Solidarity funds at the end of each year except the coefficient of variation; this was built with 
income information of the population living in the municipalities where the funds are located. 
This information refers to the employed population by level of monthly income in minimum 
wages registered by the XI General Census of Population and Housing, 1990, from the 
INEGI. The Census of 1990 was used because it is the closest information available at the 
municipal level to 1994, i.e. it is the year for which information is available for the profits and 
losses statement of the solidarity funds.  
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9. Estimation of econometric equations 
 
It was used a sample with 54 observations of the 118 Solidarity funds registered in 1994 at the 
municipal level. The selection of this sample size deserves further explanation. The funds 
were constituted in 1992, formally began operations in 1993 and their first state of results in 
FONAES was in December 1993. That year the majority of the funds had not reported 
recoveries because they had distributed credits just a few days before or because of the lack of 
financial accounting knowledge from -the funds operators. Thus, in December 1994, the 
second year in which they reported their results, only 54 of them provided information on 
loans, savings and recoveries. Applying the method of ordinary least squares in the three 
cross-section equations, the following estimators were obtained. 
 
Independent Variables  
Dependent Variables  
LnLoans LnSavings LnRecoveries 
Ln
1
Loan Funds  
0.7687*** 
(0.1820) 
  
LnEquity 
 0.7684*** 
(0.6478) 
 
Average Loans 
  509.3913*** 
(37.0145) 
Average Loans
 2
 
  -0.0273*** 
(0.0024) 
Ln SocialKT 
0.2927*** 
(0.1351) 
0.5874*** 
(0.4142) 
627.7429
3
*** 
(102.3964) 
Constant 
-6.6022*** 
(2.4718) 
- 5.214** 
(4.4987) 
-198693 
(168445.8) 
Percentage of illiterate population over 15 
years old.  
-0.0230* 
(0.0153) 
-0.0057 
(0.0392 ) 
5511.886 
( 4693.434) 
Percentage of population without primary 
completed aged 15 and more years old 
0.0109 
(0.0119) 
0.0157 
( 0.0297) 
1149.41 
( 4726.741) 
Percentage of households’ occupants without 
toilet or drainage. 
0.0072 
(0.0071) 
-0.0141 
(0.0201) 
-971.921 
( 2024.441) 
Percentage of households’ occupants without 
electricity. 
-0.0015 
(0.0079) 
-0.0027 
( 0.0253) 
672.0309 
( 2181.835) 
Percentage of dwellings without piped water. 
 
-0.0011 
(0.0071) 
0.0202* 
(0.0187) 
3177.239* 
( 1877.545) 
Percentage of households with overcrowding 
 
-0.0173* 
(0.0109) 
-0.0238 
( 0.0309) 
-1886.447 
( 2543.655) 
Percentage of occupants in houses with dirt 
floor 
 
0.0118** 
(0.0065) 
-0.0207* 
( 0.0167) 
-1925.089 
( 2455.353) 
Percentage of population in localities with 
fewer than 5,000 inhabitants 
-0.0045 
(0.0053) 
0.0209** 
( 0.0124) 
-358.7182 
( 1473.258) 
Percentage of population with income less 
than 2 minimum wages 
-0.0168** 
(0.0097) 
-0.0455** 
( 0.0247) 
-4163.998** 
( 2306.558) 
N 54 46 42 
R
2
   0.5945 0.5247 0.9119 
R
2
 adjusted 0.4883 0.4315 0.8754 
1
 Ln=natural logarithm; 
3
there are not included logarithms only in this term because the functional form of the 
recoveries equation. The terms in parentheses refer to the values of the standard errors. Significance levels are 
***(99%), **(95%) y *(90%). The variables were significant in the joined form. 13 
 
                                                          
13
 F-estadistic is 5.60, 2.50 and 25.01, respectively and it probability is 0.0000 in the three cases. 
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Control variables were used from the marginalization index of CONAPO, 1990, such as 
population size, the percentage of illiterate population over 15 years, the percentage of 
population without complete elementary school aged 15 years, the percentage of occupants in 
houses without drainage or toilet, the percentage of occupants in houses without electricity, 
the percentage of occupants in houses without piped water, the percentage of households with 
overcrowding, the percentage of occupants in houses with dirt floors, the percentage of the 
population in localities with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants, the percentage of the population 
with income less than 2 minimum wages. We included these variables as controls in order to 
analyze the effects of social capital in the financial behaviour in the municipalities where 
access to financial services is limited and because the degree of marginalization of a 
municipality is highly correlated with lack of access to financial services Yaron, (1994)
 14
. 
 
In the three equations, the econometric results reported that social capital was significant in 
loans, savings and recoveries. In all three cases the sign is positive. It was not observed a 
behaviour pattern in the control variables, with the exception of the indicator: Percentage of 
population with income less than 2 minimum wages, which was statistically significant in all 
three equations, i.e. when people earn less than two minimum wages they save less and there 
is less recovery. When isolating the components and estimating the three equations but only 
with the marginalization index integrated the results are as follows: 
 
Independent variables 
Dependent variables  
LnLoans LnSavings LnRecoveries 
Ln
1
Loan Funds 
0.7255*** 
(0.1668) 
  
LnEquity 
 0.7012** 
(0.6887) 
 
Average Loans 
  505.9847*** 
(31.1905) 
Average Loans
2
 
  -0.0273*** 
(0.0019) 
LnSocialKT 
0.2302*** 
(0.1296) 
0.5557*** 
(0.4434) 
596.4765
3
*** 
(95.0629) 
Constant 
-5.0011** 
(1.9213) 
- 5.6483** 
(4.4871) 
-454341.7** 
(57084.64) 
Index of marginalization 
0.1736** 
(0.0965) 
-0.2958** 
( 0.1499) 
60.493*** 
( 20844.21) 
n 54 42 42 
R
2
   0.4971 0.5014 0.8878 
R
2
 adjusted  0.4669 0.4011 0.8757 
1
Ln=natural logarithm; 
3
there are not included logarithms only in this term because the functional form of the 
recoveries equation. The terms in parentheses refer to the values of the standard errors. Significance levels are 
***(99%), **(95%) y *(90%). The variables were significant in the joined form. 15 
 
Again, in the three equations social capital was significant with positive sign. It was observed 
that when the equations were estimated with the marginalization integrated index it has an 
effect on the loans, savings and recoveries. That is, when the members of the solidarity funds 
are located in marginalized municipalities, the percentage of loans is higher but the 
                                                          
14
 In 2000, only 13% of municipalities with high and very high marginalization in Mexico had some kind of 
financial intermediation in the region. Source: The portal of microfinance in Mexico 
http://www.microfinanzas.net 
 
15
 F-estatistic was 16.47, 13.39 and 73.19, respectively, and the probability was 0.0000 in the three cases. 
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percentage of savings is lower (perhaps because the income effect), although the amount of 
recoveries is greater. 
 
In the first equation, it is observed that 49.71% of the variation in loans is explained by the 
variation in the loanable funds and social capital. It can be inferred that the services provided 
by the solidarity funds via loans depend positively on the amount of resources available to 
loan compounds of the equity and savings, and social capital. It also follows that the greater 
the resources available to the Fund, the greater the number of loans to be granted. The same 
with social capital, with greater social capital more loans will be allocated. It was also 
demonstrated that there are constant returns to scale
16
, which means that if the amount of each 
factor doubles (equity, savings and social capital), it the number of loans that are granted also 
doubles, ceteris paribus. Substituting the values of the estimated coefficients in the 
production function the result is as follows: 
 
Loans= 0.006 Loan Funds
0.7255 
SocialKT
0.2302
 
 
The value of the constant means that if the loanable funds and social capital are equal to one, 
the loans value is 0.006%
17
, ceteris paribus, i.e., when the amounts of equity and savings are 
small and the sympathy between members is very low, the amount of loans that is granted is 
minimal and zero when they are close or equal to unity. 
 
The loanable funds and social capital coefficients are the product elasticities of the loans. 
Thus, an increase of 1% in the loanable funds generates an increase of 0.7255% in the loans 
given, ceteris paribus. In the same way, if social capital rises by 1%, the product (measured 
by the loans) increases by 0.2302%, ceteris paribus. Although social capital has a significant 
impact on the loans allocation that is lower than that of the loanable funds, i.e. the provision 
of funds affects more than the existence of the total social capital to give more loans. After 
estimating the second equation, the values of the coefficients are obtained and replaced in the 
production function the result is as follows: 
 
Savings= 0.003 Equity
0.7012 
SocialKT
0.5557
 
 
From these results, it appears that changes in equity and social capital explain 50.14 percent 
of the variations in the number of collected savings. It can be inferred that the services 
provided by the solidarity funds via savings depend positively on the amount of resources for 
financing, and also on social capital. In this regard, most available resources, by expanding 
the equity, generate greater savings collection. In the same way, more social capital leads to 
greater confidence in the resource deposit in the solidarity funds. There were also constant 
returns to scale
18
, which means that if the amount of equity and social capital doubles, the 
number of savings that are captured also doubles. 
 
It also follows that the value of savings is 0.00319 if the equity and social capital are equal to 
one, in other words, when the amount of resources to finance is small and the sympathy that 
exists between members is very low, the amount of savings that is captured is minimal or zero 
if they are close or equal to unity, ceteris paribus. The equity and social capital coefficients 
                                                          
16
 Wald test (F-estatistic was 0.8013 and probability was 0.4012). 
17
 exp
-5.0011
=0.006 
18
 Wald test (F-estatistic was  0.9889 and probability was 0.1758). 
19
 exp
-5.6483
=0.003 
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represent the product elasticities of the savings. Thus, an increase of 0.7012% in the savings is 
produced by a 1% increase in wealth, ceteris paribus. In the same way, the product (measured 
by the number of savings) rises at 0.5557% if the social capital increases by 1%, ceteris 
paribus. Again, social capital has a significant effect in attracting savings, but it is less than 
the equity, i.e., the provision of resources affects more to finance than the existence of social 
capital to attract more savings. 
 
In the same way, using the sample with 54 observations the coefficients of the third equation 
were estimated. The 88.78% of the variation in recoveries was explained by the variation in 
average loans, square average loans and the social capital. It can be inferred that the 
performance of the funds (measured by recovery) depends positively on the amount of loans 
allocated by the producer, negatively on the square average loans and positively on the 
existing social capital. Substituting the values of the estimated coefficients in equation three 
the result is as follows: 
 
Recoveries= – 454341.7+505.98AverageLoans – 0.0273AverageLoans
2
 +596.47SocialKT 
  
From the estimations, it is inferred that if the total of social capital increases by one unit, the 
amount of recoveries is increased by 596.47 pesos, ceteris paribus. The interpretation of the 
above implies that for every additional producer that owns and activates their social capital 
with his partners there will be generated increases in the recoveries of loans by an amount of 
596.47 pesos. In this sense, a greater investment in social capital will recover a greater 
amount of borrowed funds. In the same way, if the average loans in each Fund increase in one 
unit, the amount of recoveries will increase 505.98 pesos, ceteris paribus. If the square 
average loan in each fund increases in one unit, the amount of recoveries is reduced in 0.0273 
pesos, ceteris paribus. In this way, a larger amount of average loans given by a Fund 
generates recoveries of the resources but after reaching a certain value they begin to decline 
with increased average loans. In marginal terms, increases in recoveries due to the increase in 
average loans will be higher than the reductions before reaching the maximum value. The 
peak is reached at: 
 
      
  
03.267,9
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The above result comes from the maximization of recoveries and implies that by increasing 
the solidarity funds loans per member by a unit the recoveries are increased in 505.98 pesos 
on average, but after that, when loans exceed the amount of 9267.03 pesos the recoveries start 
to decrease in 0.0273 pesos per average loan additional. If the social capital and 
marginalization index had a value of zero, at the inflection point, recoveries would be of 
1,890,168.53 pesos. Loans by a producer in the sample of 54 observations are of 1,966.44 
pesos on average and the amount of recoveries is of 410,591.11 pesos on average, meaning 
that funds may still allocate loans per producer of 7,300.59 pesos on average before reaching 
the peak and start to experience reductions in their recoveries. 
 
The constant has a special treatment in this equation. Since negative values of the constant 
have no sense from the recoveries, the constant would only get the value of average loans 
when the recoveries are not obtained, which could be reached in 951.75 pesos if both social 
capital and the marginalization index had a value of zero. 
 
It is important to note that although the amount of loans given to producers affected 
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significantly the amount of recoveries, the greatest effect is produced by the total social 
capital. Thus, it is expected that a greater investment in social capital allows greater 
recoveries of loans. 
 
From the results obtained of the estimation of the third equation it is inferred that the 
recoveries of the borrowed funds are dependent on average loans and social capital. 
Furthermore, it shows that social capital positively affects the performance of the solidarity 
funds via recoveries and that they have a different behaviour with the increase in average 
loans. Therefore, it can be concluded that social capital has a significant effect on the 
productivity of the solidarity funds in the sense that it helps to attract more savings and to 
allocate more loans and it also affects the financial performance of the funds. 
 
10. Conclusions 
 
Classical economic theory assumes that the relations of sympathy or antipathy between 
individuals do not substantially affect the outcome of transactions. This implies that social 
distance between suppliers and purchasers is often very large so that these relations do not 
affect prices and quantities that are assigned are taken from the market. However, evidence 
suggests that relationships matter. They can alter and modify terms of market performance. 
Social capital refers to networks, norms and trust that facilitate cooperation for mutual benefit. 
 
Given that social capital makes it possible to achieve certain resources that could not be 
achieved in its absence or could do so only at high cost, this allows poor producers to have 
access to financing and helps microfinance schemes to reach their financial sustainability. In 
Microfinance, social capital works by solidarity bonds, neighbourhood and community 
organization operates under the mechanisms of peer pressure and peer monitoring which 
allows them to minimize costs of monitoring and credit analysis. The problem of adverse 
selection is minimized because members select their peers to participate in these schemes. 
Their members use social collateral to obtain loans and as security for loan repayment, its 
principal asset is the trust that exists between them. 
 
Social capital in the solidarity funds is expressed by participation, trust and responsibility of 
the members. They take the voluntary decision to constitute the funds with the loan recoveries 
given by government programs. They decide who can be a new member based on the 
information they have on their reliability and ability to pay shown in their own communities. 
They are owners of these mechanisms and responsible for the recovery of resources at the 
same time, they are also responsible for monitoring and evaluating the solidarity funds. Their 
involvement in the creation, discussion and monitoring of the operation rules has contributed 
to the organization and evolution of the solidarity funds. Both, peer pressure and peer 
monitoring scheme have reduced the problems of fraud or default, which has helped to reduce 
the risk of bankruptcy and prevent its spread to other regional economic sectors. 
 
In order to prove that social capital is productive in the solidarity funds, the social capital 
effects were analyzed (associated with the members) in loans allocation, collection of savings 
and recovery of loans. To this objective the following hypotheses were explored : a) social 
capital can be estimated through an index of inequality by using extrapolation method; b) 
social capital affects the productivity of the solidarity funds, and c) social capital affects the 
financial performance of the solidarity funds. 
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From the results obtained in testing the first hypothesis by the extrapolation method, it was 
inferred an inverse relationship between social capital and inequality in two ways with five 
indexes of inequality and trust indicators of social capital. The results show that the best 
proxy for estimating social capital is the coefficient of variation. To verify this relationship 
social capital was estimated at country level and state level under the two methods. The 
results showed a similar trend in their behaviour and an inverse relationship between the 
variables of social capital and inequality. Thus, the years in which the highest inequality was 
presented are also the years with lowest investment in capital. In the same way, the states that 
showed the highest rates of inequality are also those who had the lowest percentages of social 
capital. 
 
To test the second hypothesis the services offered by the solidarity funds (number of loans 
and savings) were estimated through two productivity equations represented by Cobb Douglas 
production functions . The inputs considered were loanable funds, equity and social capital. 
From these results, it was deduced that the services provided by the funds via loans depend 
positively on the amount of resources available to offer loans and the existing social capital. It 
was also noted that the greater the resources available in the Fund, the greater the number of 
loans to be granted and the greater the social capital, the greater the amount of loans to be 
allocated. In the same way it was observed that the number of saving transactions depends 
positively on equity and social capital; it was noted at the greater provision of resources 
through the expansion of equity, generates greater savings and also more social capital 
generates greater confidence to deposit resources in the solidarity funds. 
 
To test the third hypothesis, it was estimated a performance equation through recoveries. The 
results show that the fund’s performance, measured by recoveries, depends positively on the 
amount of loans allocated per member, negatively on square average loans and positively to 
the existing social capital. It was also noted that the average loan recoveries increase and 
reach a point where a larger amount of loans makes them lose control of the recoveries and 
instead of increasing them, they reduce. 
 
Additionally, it was found that greater investment in social capital recovers a greater amount 
of borrowed funds. It was noted that although the amount of loans granted by producers affect 
the amount of recoveries, the greatest effect is produced by social capital. Thus, it is expected 
that greater investment in social capital allows higher loan recoveries. 
 
It was analyzed the importance of social capital in the sense that the performance and 
productivity of a microfinance program can be expanded or limited by its social capital. 
However, these conclusions were deduced from a scheme with government participation, it is 
questionable whether public efforts in the allocation of credits can be successful without 
sufficient levels of social capital provided by the members. Therefore, it is appropriate to 
examine the assumptions outlined in microfinance schemes without government involvement, 
such as FINCA, CAME, among others. 
 
The solidarity funds do not have the authorization from CNBV to operate as EACPs in terms 
of the LACP because they are civil societies. This status limits the development of these 
financial funds and prevents them from having the backing of the banking authorities, this is 
not a serious obstacle to their development, but may be in the future. So, while for internal 
management, the funds have statutes and operation rules approved by the membership, it is 
necessary to be supported and backed by the appropriate legislation. In this sense, social 
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capital has a special advantage on the legal aspect of the solidarity funds; its operation 
mechanisms, supervision and funds control gives confidence and certainty to the members on 
the use and recovery of resources. Otherwise this could not be observed because of the funds 
legal situation under which they could not be governed by other statutes that imply high costs 
for the funds or would change its social denomination. 
 
Perhaps, the most important conclusion is that relationships influence the products and the 
loans recoveries, and so the economic recommendations include actions to build, maintain 
and increase social capital. Investment in social capital can be achieved when individuals are 
involved in cooperative or synergistic activities in which those involved have an interest in 
the success of others, and therefore have more communication, share common causes and 
responsibilities, offer more favourable trade terms, create social bonds and interact for the 
benefit of the community. The design of social programs that are based or encourage 
participation may boost this kind of synergistic activities. 
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